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## **National Intelligence Daily** (Cable)

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Intelligence

**Top Secret** 

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USSR-POLAND: Soviet	Support	
	f Premier Jaruzelski's visit, President cal support but hedged on future Soviet	2
characterized the sit and sometimes dramati the "waves of anarchy recede overnight. He to Poland will "conti CEMA integration. Bu revealed an "identity	oring the visiting leader, Brezhnev cuation in Poland as "complicated ically difficult" and observed that y, chaos, and terror" would not asserted that Soviet economic aid inue" but stressed the need to deepen rezhnev claimed that negotiations had y of views" and characterized the "friendship, comradely solidarity,	2
said the USSR is now it there would be no agreed that a broader and said that brother show "solidarity" wit	Jaruzelski emphasized the aid he supplying and claimed that without way out of the "crisis." Jaruzelski CEMA tie is necessary for Poland in the "socialist family" should the one in troubleperhaps a in obtaining more aid from Eastern	
facing Jaruzelski rep Polish leader will ne The remarks may be in pressure should be pu	nev's stark portrayal of the problems presents an acknowledgment that the ed time to remedy the situation. Intended to quiet those who believe at on Jaruzelski to move more rapidly nice and restore civilian rule.	. 2
his calculation that martial law began wou demand it. Brezhnev' level of Soviet aid w	ress on the need for aid may reflect this first visit to Moscow since ald put him in a strong position to s remarks, however, imply that the will depend largely on the extent agns its economic ties more toward	2
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LIBYA-TUNISIA: Closer Relations	
Libya and Tunisia are trying to renew eco	pnomic and political
cooperation after years of strained relations.	
Libyan leader Qadhafi's five-day v	isit to Tunisia,
which ended on Saturday, has resulted i	n an agreement
to broaden cooperation and to establish	a joint commis-
sion to coordinate relations. Tunisian	President Bour-
guiba wants to reduce the possibility o	f Libyan subversion
among the approximately 80,000 Tunisian	workers in Libya,
and he hopes to improve commercial ties	with Libya.
	_
Comment: Qadhafi presumably views	the reconcilia-
tion with Tunisia as an opportunity to	enhance his poor
international reputation before assuming	g the chairmanship
of the OAU this summer. His willingnes	s to put aside
the abortive merger agreement of 1974 is	ndicates that he
is prepared for the time being to use m	ore conventional
methods to influence Tunis's policies.	The Libyan
leader also may view reconciliation wit	h Bourquiba as
the best way to prevent Tunisian collus	ion with the US
against him.	
Bourguiba probably will refuse any	
for joint exploitation of offshore hydro	
even though Tunisia was the loser in the	
International Court of Justice last week	
most of a disputed offshore area to Lib	
leaders mistrust Qadhafi and will avoid	
Tripoli that jeopardizes their relation	ships with other
countries, particularly the US.	

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EGYPT-ISRAEL: Mubarak's Visit in Jeopardy
//President Mubarak's planned visit to Israel this month is in doubt following the Israeli announcement on Sunday that his refusal to visit Jerusalem will cause the trip to be canceled. Egypt's Foreign Minister and press sources in Jerusalem, however, have indicated that the trip is still under discussion. Cairo is explaining its position in Western capitals through diplomatic channels. The US Embassy in Tel Aviv believes senior Israeli officials hope to minimize the publicity surrounding cancellation of the trip. They hope to avoid giving nationalist Jewish settlers and their political supporters a means to rally greater opposition to Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai next month.//
Comment: //Mubarak clearly is reluctant to take any action that might be construed as legitimizing Israel's annexation of the Arab sector of Jerusalem. He also is worried that a visit there might cause a furor in the Arab world and impede chances for a rapprochement with the other Arabs after the Israeli pullback.//
USSR: New First Deputy Chairman for KGB
Georgiy Tsinev, a longtime associate of President Brezhnev, has been named as the new First Deputy Chairman of the KGB, replacing S. K. Tsvigun, who died in January. Tsinev is a member of the group of Brezhnev's early associates who have risen to high positions. Last year he was promoted to full membership in the Central Commit-
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Comment: Brezhnev's ability to make the appointment indicates that he maintains a strong hold on the reins of power despite current rumors in Moscow that he might be in political trouble.
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PAKISTAN: Mass Arrests	
President Zia on Saturday announce more than 2,000 persons, primarily in 3 Provinces. Many of those detained reportant criminals, but numerous opposition pollow-to-middle level and some student legisled.	Sind and Punjab ortedly are common iticians at the
Comment: Two possible assassinated within the past month apparently as justify the crackdown, which is intendented the President's view that the internal unstable for extensive political activals also appear to respond to criticism of situation by members of Zia's Federal and are a warning to all politicians no hard for early elections.	re being used to ed to underline situation is too ity. The arrests the law-and-order Advisory Council

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Lisbon has asked t	f Soviet Bloc Representation the Soviet, Polish, and East German eir diplomatic staffs by one-third.
impassies to reduce the	er diplomatic stairs by one-third.
claims that its request martial law in Poland, a major role. Lisbon we for the Soviets and Easthe Portuguese Communist campaign to bring downrest. Soviet retaliate Portuguese Government political and economic	th the Portuguese Government publicly to is tied to the continuation of internal politics also have played wants to make it more difficult st Germans in particular to support st Party, which currently is waging win the government through labor ation would have little effect on ent because of the low level of relations between Portugal and
Soviet Bloc countries.	
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TANZANIA: Reactions to Hijacking	
//Tanzanian officials are concerned that the hijack- ing over the weekend of an Air Tanzania airliner may lead to more antigovernment moves. The hijackers' demand that President Nyerere resign has struck a responsive note	
among many Tanzanians dissatisfied with the President's socialist policies. Security officials reportedly fear	. •
that the incident may be part of a larger plot to oust	25 <b>X</b> 1
Comment: //The President, who has been looking for the right moment to retire, now may hasten his efforts	
to find a suitable successor.//	25X1

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS		
CHINA-US: Anniversary of the Sl	hanghai Communique	25
//The letter to President Reagar authoritative press commentary on the Shanghai Communique underscore China's ing close relations with the US, while Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. Zhao some flexibility on the issue of US ar remains uncertain whether China will acceptable to the US. China still regpartner in opposition to the USSR and and technology for economic modernization.	10th anniversary of the strong interest in develop- e maintaining a firm line on o's letter implies at least rms sales to Taiwan, but it deal with this issue on terms gards the US as a strategic as a source of investment tion.//	25
recent weeks to indicate that US have created a crisis in relation authoritative public commentary the need for recognition of Chiraliwan and for an end to the US with the island. Without these stated, Sino-US relations would	ons with the US. An yesterday emphasized na's sovereignty over arms supply relationship steps, the commentary	25
//Zhao's letter and the present a dual approach that may contain the Chinese attempt to find a baproblem.//	ontinue for some time as	25
//The strong historical, ensignificance of the Taiwan issue the Chinese leaders have on this lication last September of its pation, Beijing has shown great seputting it at the center of relabeling continues to regard commas the mutual interest that bind questions US priorities in allow closer strategic ties in opposite	e limits the flexibility s issue. Since the pub- proposals for reunifica- ensitivity about Taiwan, ations with Washington. mon hostility toward Moscow ds the relationship and wing Taiwan to impede	25
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Trade and Exchanges
//The current commitment to modernization provides further incentive for closer ties with the West in general and with the US in particular. About 7,000 Chinese students and scholars are now studying in the US, mostly in the fields of science and technology.//
//Although the regime has cut back its ambitious plans for economic development, Sino-US trade has increased from very little at the time of the Shanghai Communique in 1972 to some \$5.5 billion in 1981. Beijing benefits substantially, and there is no firm indication yet that China has decided to try to force US cooperation on Taiwan by threatening a substantial reduction in trade //
//Security relations with the US have been strongly affected, however, by differences over Taiwan. Because China is unwilling to appear to acquiesce in US arms sales to Taiwan in order to secure US arms for itself, it suspended discussions with the US in the security area last summer. The Chinese nevertheless remain interested in acquiring US military equipment and technology and possibly in developing closer strategic cooperation if the Taiwan arms sales question can be resolved.//
//The Chinese also have dissociated themselves from the US on some other foreign policy questions and have strengthened their credentials as a Third World country. Chinese propaganda has recently assailed US "imperialism" and has identified both the US and the USSR as "hegemonistic" powers.//
//China has attacked US policy toward Israel and, to a lesser degree, in southern Africa. Chinese propaganda questions the wisdom of US policy in Central America, although privately the Chinese support the initiative in the Caribbean Basin.//
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//For domestic political reasons, most notably concern that the Polish experience could spread to China, Beijing has not joined in condemning the imposition of martial law in Warsaw. The Chinese, however, would certainly condemn Soviet military intervention.//
Outlook
//Beijing's divergence from Washington on some issues results from principles enunciated in the resolution of the Sixth Plenum last June that stated that there must be no submissiveness in dealing with "big, powerful, or rich countries." Even if the issue of US arms sales to Taiwan is resolved, China probably will continue to assert its independence in ways that include opposition to US policies in some areas of the Third World.//
//At the same time, Chinese commentary reaffirms Beijing's desire for good relations with the US. Premier Zhao's letter supports the view, moreover, that a settle- ment of the current difficulties would enable the Chinese leaders to work for a closer relationship in the area that matters the most to themopposition to the USSR.//

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